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Based on the 2016 call for research proposals, six research 
projects were launched as a first beacon on the FAR re-
search agenda, strengthening the collaboration between 
auditing academics and practitioners. During the second 
plenary session of the conference, representatives of two 
of the research teams presented initial insights of their 
studies. These presentations were provided by Therese 
Grohnert and Wim Gijselaers (concerning learning cul-
ture) and Anna Gold (regarding group audits). Further-
more, Olof Bik and Jan Bouwens, who are working on a 
FAR project in a so-called ‘joint working group’, presen-
ted their study on partner incentives and performance. A 
summary of the findings of the three studies follows next, 
supplemented with a short overview of the discussion 
with the audience.
How to create a learning culture in 
audit teams?
Therese Grohnert and Wim Gijselaers (and their co-researcher 
Roger Meuwissen) are affiliated with Maastricht University
Why are some audit teams better than others at collabo-
rating, at resolving complex problems, and ultimately, 
at performing? Do ‘hard’ factors make the difference, 
such as team composition or budget pressure? Or are 
‘soft’ factors key, such as tone at the top and team be-
liefs? These questions lie at the heart of the study by 
Grohnert, Meuwissen and Gijselaers. The purpose of 
their study is to investigate what conditions enable audit 
teams to perform well. In particular, the focus is on team 
learning, which they define as “continuously and colla-
boratively developing new knowledge as part of daily 
work activities”.
1. Semi-structured interviews
As a first step in the study, 29 auditors from large and 
mid-sized firms were interviewed, ranging from junior 
staff to experienced partners. Each auditor provided in-
sights from their professional experiences on two diffe-
rent team settings: working with a team that collaborated 
effectively and working in a team that did not manage to 
do so. The purpose of these semi-structured interviews 
was to find out: (1) what kind of behaviors auditors found 
effective for performing well in their teams; (2) which 
mechanisms are effective for actively fostering these be-
haviors during the audit work; and (3) which conditions 
enable teams to display these behaviors.
2. Effective team behaviors
The first interesting insight is that auditors described 
three groups of effective team behaviors that led to good 
team performance: (1) openly sharing information, help 
and feedback; (2) constructively managing conflict; and 
(3) consciously restructuring teamwork to adapt to chan-
ging circumstances. These three behaviors are well esta-
blished in the team learning literature, and research has 
connected them to high performance in a variety of other 
fields, from aviation and education to management. The 
stories told by practitioners help to parse the drivers and 
conditions of these team learning behaviors.
3. Same drivers, different needs
The second insight from the study, so far, is that auditors 
from all professional ranks identify the same drivers for 
team learning, but they differ on what they consider to be 
necessary for team learning. For example, staff auditors 
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indicated to rely on a psychologically safe team environ-
ment: being allowed to ask questions and admitting to 
mistakes without fearing negative judgment from others. 
Managers, on the other hand, were mostly concerned with 
how to create such a safe environment. From the senior 
level onwards, auditors most frequently mentioned the 
behavior of leaders as the key driver behind team learn-
ing behaviors. These leadership behaviors include asking 
team members to share concerns early, initiate informal 
contact between team members, and share one’s own 
concerns and problems with the team members. Finally, 
more experienced team members reported that in order to 
collaborate effectively, team members needed to be aware 
of their interdependence. Having this ‘team feeling’ was 
perceived to lead to all three learning behaviors.
4. Conditions for learning
Finally, auditors mentioned the conditions that enable 
them to effectively collaborate and to learn. Face-to-fa-
ce contact and being familiar with each other was per-
ceived to facilitate leadership and the ‘team feeling’, 
as well as sharing. The role of hierarchy in audit teams 
was perceived to be quite ambiguous. On the one hand, a 
clear hierarchy was associated with efficient decision-ma-
king. On the other hand, it was perceived to prevent team 
learning behaviors from occurring, unless team members 
perceive supportive leadership and psychological safety. 
Finally, auditors frequently mentioned the importance of 
team composition. Interestingly, however, team compo-
sition was never related directly to any team learning be-
havior or one of the other drivers and conditions. Only in 
the absence of sufficient staffing levels seniors mentioned 
experiencing increased stress.
5. ‘Soft’ factors are important
These tentative results show the importance of ‘soft’ fac-
tors. Team dynamics, partner and management involve-
ment, as well as the importance of developing new pro-
fessional knowledge are central to understanding team 
performance. Actively facilitating the three team learning 
behaviors through role modelling at the top and through 
creating a psychologically safe climate provides more op-
tions for managing audit team performance than a strong 
focus only on composition or hierarchy.
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Improving the quality of global 
group audits
Anna Gold is professor of auditing at the Vrije Universiteit 
Amsterdam. Her co-researchers on this project are Den-
ise Downey (Villanova University) and Andrew Trotman 
(Northeastern University).
Inspection agencies across various jurisdictions repeated-
ly find deficiencies in group audits and regulators have 
expressed concerns regarding the quality of group audits. 
This project, presented by Anna Gold, is designed to help 
identify underlying root causes contributing to the low 
audit quality exhibited within many group audits, through 
the perspective of component auditors themselves.
1. First results
To date, 111 experienced component audit leaders have 
been surveyed in Australia, India, and the Netherlands, 
representing multiple global firms. Anna Gold presented 
the key findings concerning four audit phases (staffing, 
planning, fieldwork, and review), and then provided 
further collective insights from component auditors on 
potential overall barriers to component audit quality. 
These findings and insights are derived from prelimi-
nary descriptive statistics, univariate tests and qualita-
tive analyses which have been conducted to date.
2. Staffing: availability is the dominant determinant
Component auditors’ responses suggest that group audi-
tors provide limited and untimely direction and input to 
guide component audit staffing decisions. Staff availabili-
ty appears to be the dominant determinant in component 
audit staff selection. More timely receipt of scheduling 
requests is viewed as a positive feature to the staffing pha-
se of audits perceived to be of higher-quality. However, 
when component auditors take greater ownership over 
staffing, they perceive improved audit outcomes.
3. Planning: low level of component auditor autonomy
Component auditors generally comply with group au-
ditor specifications of the audit plan, including risk and 
materiality, as there are relatively few modifications of 
these specifications, suggesting a relatively low level 
of component auditor autonomy in planning the audit. 
Component auditors also consider group auditor invol-
vement, direction, and coordination in the planning phase 
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as particularly important in differentiating the quality of 
the component audit process as well as audit outcomes. 
However, there are some instances where the component 
auditors alter group auditor specifications, because they 
perceive the group auditor doesn’t sufficiently understand 
the component, which is in line with concerns voiced by 
the regulators and standard setters.
4. Fieldwork: communication is needed
Engagements on which component auditors openly share 
information with the group auditor, where spontaneous 
communication between the group and component audi-
tors is possible, and where meetings take place with the 
group auditor during fieldwork, are associated with better 
perceived audit processes and outcomes.
5. Review: less than 50 percent
Consistent with regulator concerns, less than half of our 
component auditor respondents receive review comments 
from the group auditor. The lack of such review by the 
group auditor is associated with poorer audit quality out-
comes from the perspective of component auditors. In the 
cases where a review does occur, several review characte-
ristics may enhance the potential of improving audit out-
comes. Factors like the level of detail, skepticism, quality, 
and timeliness of the reviews are all associated with grea-
ter perceived audit outcomes, providing valuable recom-
mendations for group auditors.
6. Barriers are limited
The component auditor respondents experience relative-
ly limited cultural and language barriers during their en-
gagements and interactions with the group auditor. This 
result is interesting, given the cross-cultural nature of the 
collaboration and the related regulatory concerns. Of the 
few responses on cultural barriers, the prominent barrier 
described relates to differences in accounting and audit 
quality requirements between the component and group 
countries. Another barrier impacting component auditors’ 
capacity to perform the audit adequately is insufficient 
engagement fees. Commonly, the group auditor sets the 
budget for the component audit, which is often lower than 
the component audit team would require to conduct an ef-
fective audit. One takeaway from this finding is that there 
should be increased communication on fees with a detai-
led upfront agreement on fee structure. However, the ex-
tent to which this is feasible in an environment of incre-
asing fee pressure and regulatory risk is an open question.
7. Conclusion
This study offers valuable insights into group and com-
ponent auditor practices through the perspective of com-
ponent audit leaders. The results provide preliminary 
support for regulators’ call for greater group auditor in-
volvement in component audit activities. However, the 
findings also point to the importance of the adequate in-
volvement of component auditors.
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Audit partner performance and 
incentives systems in relation to 
audit quality
Olof Bik is professor of behavioral & cultural governance and 
director of the accountancy programs at Nyenrode Business 
Universiteit. He is also a member of the management board 
of FAR. Jan Bouwens is professor of accounting at the Uni-
versity of Amsterdam Business School and member of the 
management board of FAR.
Next to the regular research projects and case studies, 
FAR initiates several so-called ‘joint working groups’. 
In these groups, academics, audit practitioners and key 
stakeholders closely cooperate in studying significant au-
dit issues, which are directly relevant to the public. One 
of the two existing working groups covers ‘The future 
audit firm business model’ (the second working group, 
which is not discussed here, works on ‘Root cause analy-
sis methods in auditing). One of the research projects in 
the joint working group ‘The future audit firm business 
model’ involves audit partner performance measurement 
and compensation systems.
https://mab.pensoft.net
Luc Quadackers, Marike van Zanten: Preliminary research findings of  three FAR-studies: what has been found so far?208
During the conference, Olof Bik and Jan Bouwens 
shared and discussed preliminary insights on these issues 
by presenting three main components of current policies 
and by asking the question to the participants: “how can 
audit quality be increased by partner performance measu-
rement and compensation?”
1. Audit quality as the driver of performance: three 
main components
Dutch legislation requires that audit firms’ remunerati-
on systems, including the partner profit sharing system, 
appropriately comprise audit quality incentives. Hence, 
signing auditors should receive incentives to enhance 
audit quality (AQ) via their remuneration system. The-
refore, the focus of the study is on how audit partner per-
formance incentives systems, compensation, and profit 
sharing have recently developed as a result of more emp-
hasis on audit quality.
More specifically:
a. Regarding measurement: how is audit quality measured in 
current partner performance management systems? What 
specific AQ measures should be used?
b. With respect to performance evaluation: how is audit quality 
performance rated, based on the audit quality measures? And 
how does audit quality performance influence overall perfor-
mance, as compared to other performance areas concerning 
clients, markets, or firm strategy?
c. Concerning compensation: how can be observed that AQ is 
actually included in the incentive systems and how does AQ 
performance translate into partners’ remuneration (including 
profit sharing)?
1. Preliminary insights
Policy documents of ten audit firms show that firms dif-
fer in the way in which audit partner performance and 
compensation policies include audit quality incentives. 
For example, in general, a policy shows that partner per-
formance measures distinguish between four main areas: 
client, people, firm and quality. However, the scope and 
depth of AQ measures differs between firms.
Furthermore, regarding performance ratings, firms 
range from not having an explicit rating, to having an AQ 
rating that is part of other performance measures (e.g., 
part of the client metric), or even to explicit AQ ratings 
based on an extensive quality dashboard.
Concerning compensation, audit firms distinguish 
between equal profit sharing (all partners equally share 
in the profit, irrespective of their specific roles and res-
ponsibilities) and partner-based sharing (which uses a 
competence grid on which performance drives variable 
pay). Moreover, policy documents show three ways in 
which audit quality performance influence partner com-
pensation: (1) by using penalties in case of poor quality 
performance (measured by a percentage of the profit or 
by an absolute amount); (2) by integrating quality per-
formance into performance-based compensation (e.g., if 
quality is under the norm, the whole performance rating 
is lower, regardless of performance on other metrics); or 
(3) by providing an (explicit) bonus for good quality per-
formance.
It should be noted that even if audit quality incentives 
are a part of audit partners’ performance measurement 
and compensation systems, the question remains whether 
this positively affects audit quality.
2. Do quality incentives lead to higher audit quality?
The practitioners were put to work, by posing them a gen-
eral question: how would you use audit quality through 
partner performance measurement and compensation, in 
order to increase audit quality?
Three specific questions were discussed:
1. Should individual partner performance play a role in partner 
compensation?
2. Should audit firms use performance measures to assess the 
performance of equity partners and should their profit share 
be adjusted accordingly?
3. Should audit firms distinguish between long term perfor-
mance (for example: promotion to a higher-level results in 
a semi-permanently higher profit share) and short term per-
formance (for example: one year variable bonus or malus)?
Summary of the discussions
Many of the questions posed during the discussions of the 
above presentations were related to the research methods 
used. But also topics that are more germane to practice 
were discussed. For example, what makes learning in au-
dit teams different from learning in teams in other pro-
fessional settings? Two characteristics account for that. 
First, audit teams show a quite clear hierarchy attached 
to tasks and responsibilities, which influences social in-
teractions and the organization of the work. This in turn 
affects auditors’ experiences. The second characteristic is 
that there is not one stable team that auditors work in all 
the time. So, audit team members get less time to know 
each other well than in other professional settings. Audi-
tors often work in more than one team at the same time. 
These two characteristics may alter the existing know-
ledge from other professional settings. Getting to know 
each other, and understanding each other, of course also 
is an important factor in group audits.
And how should audit quality incentives be integrated 
into performance measurement? On the one hand: does a 
bonus for audit quality suggest that delivering quality is 
optional rather than self-evident? On the other hand: if 
quality criteria are not incorporated into performance and 
remuneration systems, wouldn’t that convey the message 
that getting a bonus is not dependent on audit quality? 
Furthermore, decisions have to be made regarding com-
pensation based on individual versus collective perfor-
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mance and short versus long term performance. Individ-
ual incentives could stimulate the high performers, but 
individual performance might be hard to measure since 
the audit is a collective effort and performance measures 
may be distorted. And while short-term rewards can de-
tract from long term performance, small short-term steps 
are often necessary in realizing change. The discussion 
was ended with these words: ‘The trickiest audits are of-
ten the worst paid ones. The performance and remunera-
tion system needs to take this into account’.
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